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Based on the premises of network approaches, this paper considers that EU foreign policy making includes a variety of actors and competing perceptions with regard to particular themes, countries and/or regions. Taking Colombia as a case study, this analysis focuses on three stages of foreign policy making.  The first is the nature of the external issue (country, theme, region) the EU has to deal with. The second is the inter-institutional perception and debate between Council, Commission and Parliament. The third is the creation of external networks with NGOs, which becomes decisive in executing cooperation policies, particularly with regard to humanitarian aid.


Theoretical Note: Networks in the EU

One of the analytical problems in the study of the European Union in general and its foreign policy in particular is that the integration process presents different degrees of integration depending on the specific sector under examination.  While areas such as trade or monetary policy are closer to the higher stages of Balassa’s framework, foreign policy and justice and home affairs have remained rooted in the traditional logic of the Westphalian state.  Under different labels, tones and nuances, the essence of the dichotomy supranational versus intergovernmental remains at the grand theory level, whereas several middle range theories have emerged in order to explain more specific areas of the European Zoon Politikon, namely, the EU.

	In 2001, the European Commission published a White Paper on European Governance, in which it made the case, inter alia, for a more structured relationship with civil society, namely, the creation of policy networks.  Networks are important for policy makers in general because they “create convergence of information; improve compliance with international rules (enforcement); and increase the scope, nature, and quality of international cooperation (harmonization).”​[1]​ Above all, the Commission proposed to “open up the policy-making process to get more people and organizations involved in the shaping and delivering of EU policy.”​[2]​ Thus, creating and including networks is not a matter of good will, but a pragmatic approach for legitimizing and delivering policies, as well as a means to link “Commission officials with representatives of interest groups and NGOs  aiding the Commission in gauging the likely reception of future EU policies on the ground.”​[3]​

	There are several definitions of networks.  From a governmental perspective, network “is a regular pattern of regular and purposive relations among like government units working across the border that divide countries from one another and that demarcate the domestic from the international sphere.”​[4]​ In the context of European integration, a definition that fits best with this particular process comes from the informal governance perspective, which states: “We consider informal governance as the operation of networks of individual and collective, public and private actors pursuing common goals --which lead to cooperation, patterned relations and public decisions—through regular non-codified and not publicly sanctioned exchanges in the context of the European Union.”​[5]​ In a similar vein, the “term policy network connotes a ‘cluster of actors, each of which has an interest, or stake in a given… policy sector and the capacity to help determine policy success or failures.”​[6]​ When specific issues are addressed by participant actors, “policy networks are arenas in which decision-makers and interests come together to mediate differences and search for solutions.”​[7]​   

	There are several types of policy networks.​[8]​  On the one end, there are tightly integrated policy communities in which membership is fluid and often hierarchical, external pressures have minimal impact, and actors are highly dependent on each other for resources.  These are often found in areas where a specific EU policy is well established, organized groups exist, and decision makers benefit from the cooperation of interests.  Examples of such policy areas include agriculture and research and development. 	At the other, there are loosely integrated issue networks, in which membership is fluid and non-hierarchical, the network is easily permeated by external influences, and actors are highly self-reliant.  Issue networks are found where EU policy is not well developed, the policy debate is fluid and shifting, and organized interests have few resources to influence decision-makers.  This is the case of policies within the second and the third pillar of the European architecture. 

	The literature on networks has developed the concepts of vertical and horizontal dimensions of networks. The first, or vertical dimension, “refers to the shifting levels of policy authority and influence between international, national, regional and even local levels of government administration. The second, or horizontal dimension, refers to the shifting competencies of policy actors and agencies arising as a consequence of new interpretations of government’s role in the organization and administration of public policy.”​[9]​ This conceptualization privileges the regional or domestic formation of networks. However, how are external (to the European region) agents included in the creation of networks in foreign policy making? 
	From the perspective of the present paper, EU foreign policy is still to a great extent determined by the willingness of the member states to act as well as by the perceptions of the transformations in international scenarios.  In the case of Colombia, there are several actors that have created networks contributing to the peace talks and reconstruction from different angles.  In order to deliver concrete policies, the Council, the Commission and the Parliament portray competing and/or complementary visions about the situation in Colombia.  By themselves, considering the external “issue” (Colombia) and the expectations that they will deliver policies, these EU institutions create an inter-institutional network. Once concrete policies have been decided within the EU, the participation of external actors such NGOs in conflicting areas is increasingly more relevant in the network policy.  NGOs provide not only information about the events in the conflicting areas, but also complement the Commission’s policies towards Colombia. Based upon the practices of the Commission on Humanitarian Aid, for example, the creation of external networks with local actors becomes crucial for carrying out successful cooperation.


The Issue of the Network: Colombia in the European Context

Latin America underwent several transformations during the 1990s.  From inward-looking economic models and authoritarian regimes, Latin America gradually moved towards free market economies and democratic systems.  However, there is a pervasive sense of disillusionment with regard to the performance of governments, both in the economic or political arenas.  In this context, the central topic of the 2004 EU-Latin America Summit was social inclusion.  By choosing this aspect of the bi-regional relationship, the EU recognized a worrisome and growing problem in the Western hemisphere: social exclusion.  Former Commissioner Chris Pattern described the current trends in Latin America as follows: 

…. In almost all Latin American countries, only 9-15% of total income goes to the poorest 40% of households. Despite a decade of reforms, the gap between rich and poor is widening…. social inequalities act as a brake on economic growth as large sections of society are unable to contribute. And politically there is a danger that people’s faith in democracy will be eroded if they consider that institutional and market reforms have failed to deliver a better quality of life.​[10]​ 

	In addition to the uncertainties brought about by the insufficient efforts of the national governments in the region, the role of Latin America in the global sphere has also been affected by the slowdown of economic growth in Europe and United States and the volatility in international financial markets.  According to the Inter-American Development Bank, the strong growth of EU-LAC trade evident for most of the 1990s ended in 1999, when flows contracted by over 5 percent in value terms.  Despite some recovery in the following years, inter-regional trade in 2003 was still below the levels recorded in 1998.​[11]​ 

	The EU-Andean Community of Nations (ACN) trade relationship has followed a similar pattern.  “There has been virtually no growth in EU trade with the Andean Community in the past decade. Andean imports from the EU grew vigorously between 1994 and 1998, but contracted equally strongly in the following five years. The trends for exports were the opposite.”​[12]​  Thus, whereas the EU, considered as a region, is in second place on the list of  ACN trade partners, the ACN  ranks 29th among the EU’s trading partners.​[13]​ From the EU’s standpoint, based only on economic trends, the Andean Community does not represent a priority in its agenda. Former Commissioner Chris Patten has straightforwardly described the economic place of the Andean countries for the EU: “The EU trades more with Vietnam than with Venezuela, more with Kazakhstan than with Colombia, more with Bangladesh than with Peru, and more with Aruba than with Bolivia.”​[14]​  

	Following the economic logic, Colombia represented 0.2 percent of total EU imports in 2002, whereas in 1980 it was 0.5 per cent.  Likewise, with regard to EU exports, Colombia received only 0.2 percent in 2002 in comparison with 0.4 percent in 1980.​[15]​  These numbers suggest that the European interest in Colombia is driven by other factors, chiefly security.  Commissioner Benita Ferrero-Waldner recently stated that, “The EU has a range of interests in Colombia, from trade and investment to the problems of drug production and drug trade, criminal networks, terrorism, migration and regional dimension to conflict in Colombia (emphasis added).”​[16]​ In this regard, the problems derived from the internal conflict in Colombia contribute to the deterioration of the regional and international security.  

	The complexities of the Colombian conflict as well as the “strategic and historical distance” hamper a more active European involvement in it. To provide a glimpse of the nature of the conflict, the  Norwegian Refugee Council has summarized the deep causes of the Colombian situation  as follows: a) the extremely unfair division of land and other resources, b) the lack of democratic channels of influence available to the people, c) the state’s inadequate presence in certain parts of the country, d) the enormous resources from the drugs trade that have contributed to the escalation of the conflict, and e) the extremist right-wing paramilitary groups and the left-oriented guerrilla groups.​[17]​ In Adam Jones’ perspective, “In few countries of the world in recent decades has para-institutional violence been so pervasive as in Colombia, and in few other instances have paramilitary formations amassed so substantial share of political control and political power.”​[18]​

	Due to the worsening of the conflict, the 2004-2009 European Commission has based its general strategy towards the Colombian conflict on three fundamental principles: a) the promotion of respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, coupled with a thorough follow-up of the humanitarian situation; b) good governance, in particular support for the Colombian Government’s efforts to strengthen the rule of law throughout the whole country; and c) sustainable development and social cohesion.​[19]​ In the past decade, the EU’s approach has developed some concrete policies towards Colombia. At the donors’ conference in April 2001, the Commission promised €140 million to Colombia between 2001 and 2006, the largest sum for a single country in Latin America. By the end of 2003, the Commission had already released €136 million and it is expected that between 2005 and 2006 extra resources will be committed.​[20]​ 

	The EU participation in the reconstruction and pacification of Colombia is significant. However, in comparison to the active role of the United States in the area, even without considering Plan Colombia, the European contribution is overshadowed and less substantial.  Table 1 presents the perceptions of Colombian public opinion in that regard. 





Source: Elaboration based on Marta Lagos, América Latina & Unión Europea. Percepción Ciudadana. Latinobarómetro 2004. Focus Latinoamericano (Chile: Corporación Justicia y Democracia, 2004)






At the Community level, the architecture of the EU encompasses three main institutions in foreign policy making.  In light of the concentration of power in the decision making process, the most important institution is the Council of the EU (composed of member states), which is a collective body of decision making.  The second institution is the European Commission, defined by its tasks of monitoring compliance, providing expert regulation, facilitating policy making, and exerting influence on the principal agents of the EU, namely, the member states and the Council of the EU.  The third is the European Parliament, which shares legislative powers with the Council, basically through the assent procedure in the ratification of international agreements.  These three institutions forge a horizontal inter-institutional network in the policy making, with standpoints that may be divergent or convergent with regard to specific themes, countries and/or regions. 

	The Council of the EU has been aware of the challenge the Colombian conflict represents to the international community.  Two features can be identified in the policy-making in the Council with regard to Colombia.  The first is the diversity of viewpoints. For instance, in the context of the debate on Plan Colombia, Belgium and Germany insisted that the EU should distance itself from such a Plan and that European assistance should be limited by a set of conditions.  On the other hand, Italy, Sweden, Germany, Austria and Denmark were prone to support program funding for the protection of human rights and the involvement of civil society.​[23]​  The second is that with the exception of two or three countries, most of the EU members consider the Colombian conflict as a low priority on their agendas.  In the case of Germany, Detlef Nolte has insisted that the German policy towards Latin America fits into the EU general approach since “Many in the foreign policy community argue that German interests are better represented as part of a common European Latin America policy than individually. Others argue that this could be a way to get rid off a minor topic in foreign relations in order to save time for more serious foreign policy matters.”​[24]​ In this regard, Spain, the United Kingdom, Netherlands and France are the EU member with a relatively higher interest in the Colombian conflict.

	As a result of the consensus of its members, the general approach delineated by the Council is based on both support for the Colombian government and a firm condemnation of the deterioration of the humanitarian situation resulting from the long-standing conflict.  In the middle of both positions, the Council has recently conditioned a further involvement depending on concrete results of the peace talks.  By reviewing the conclusions of the General Affairs Councils on Colombia, some elements can be presented as the guidelines of the EU strategy towards Colombia.  A review of the conclusions of the General Affairs Council on Colombia suggests that there are some elements which can be considered guidelines of the EU’s strategy towards Colombia.​[25]​ 

	The most important feature is the “European Union's full support for the Colombian Government, notably in its efforts to establish the rule of law throughout the country and in its fight against terrorism and illicit drug production and trafficking.”​[26]​ Along those lines, the Council welcomed the decision of the Colombian Government to pardon 23 members of the FARC in 2004 and has persistently reiterated its demand that illegal armed groups that still detain hostages must release them immediately and unconditionally.  Likewise, the Council welcomed the December 15, 2004 meeting between President Uribe and representatives of civil society, which represents the implementation of some of the recommendations made by the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights. 

	In the same supportive line, the Council, based upon a briefing by former Commissioner Patten in February 2004, welcomed the reduction in the overall numbers of murders and kidnappings in Colombia as indicated by the released statistics, and hoped that this downward trend would continue.  In this respect, the Council expressed its satisfaction regarding the extension of the EU Generalized System of Preferences as well as the launch of the second EU Peace Laboratory. 

	On the other hand, the deteriorating situation of civil society, NGOs and human rights has been stressed several times by the Council.  In the Council conclusions of December 10, 2002, the Council expressed deep concern with respect to the worsening of the situation of human rights and urged the Colombian Government to increase its efforts against impunity.  Likewise, in the context of President Uribe’s visit to Brussels in February 2004, the Council pointed out the perilous security conditions under which local and international NGOs and civil society organizations, including trade unions and human rights defenders, carry out their work in Colombia, and called on the Government to co-operate closely with all such groups to ensure their protection.  In December 2004, taking as a base the Declaration of Guadalajara, the Council once again noted the importance of ensuring the safety of those individuals, organizations or institutions working for the promotion and protection of human rights.  The Council has also called on the Colombian authorities for an early adoption of a comprehensive legal framework for the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of the illegal armed groups.  Such a framework should be in conformity with international commitments and take into account the right of the victims to truth, justice and reparation. 

	The Council has acknowledged that the Colombian conflict needs the active participation of several other international organizations and countries and has stressed its strong support for the good offices of the United Nations Secretary-General, and welcomed the engagement of the Organization of the American States, the Government of Mexico and the Group of Friends countries, as well as the efforts of the Catholic Church in the processes towards peace in Colombia.  In fact, on December 13, 2004, the EU conditioned its participation depending upon the progress made by the parties: 


	More specifically, the Council expressed the European Union's readiness to pursue an effective and result-oriented engagement.  A more formal EU involvement could take place through timely political endorsement for the ongoing peace process once the Colombian Government has set out a comprehensive legal framework.  In this respect the Council underlined that the European Union would have great difficulty in endorsing the peace talks as long as the illegal armed groups have not ceased hostilities.  Following a gradual approach linked to developments on the ground, the Council also expressed its readiness to provide concrete and adequate financial support for the outcome of such talks once a comprehensive strategy concerning concentration, disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of the members of the illegal armed groups in the society has been defined.​[27]​ 


The European Commission not only executes the policies decided by the Council, but also actively works in the development of external networks in the areas of conflict in Colombia.  With regard to the execution of policies, the Commission has insisted that the cooperation with Colombia has been too dispersed both in sectors covered and in the number of actions.  Likewise, several projects in Colombia have faced delays and problems in implementation for several reasons, including problems in the identification phase caused by the complexity of the situation on the ground and in particular, the degree of violence.  The rapid changes in the situation on the ground also make it difficult to identify the programs correctly since the situation at the beginning of the project may largely differ from the one when the project was identified.​[28]​ Thus, in the execution of policies, the Commission acknowledges that the evolution of the conflict has to do with the extreme weakness of the state. ​[29]​

	In addition to the technical problems in cooperating with Colombia, the Commission also made public some of its disagreements with regard to the approaches in the complex pacification process.  During his visit to Colombia in January 2004, Commissioner Chris Patten expressed the European criticism on the drug eradication program, which is supported by the United States, and informed that the EU has refused to fund fumigations of the Andes citing their impact on the life and well-being of Colombians, as well as on the environment.  Likewise, in a press conference in Bogota, he stated that, 


Many people will want to discuss with him (Uribe) the recommendations of the United Nations… The improvement in civil liberties and human rights can and must go hand-in-hand with the overcoming of violence.. Colombia's commitment to basic freedoms is important to all of us in Europe who want to play as generous a part as possible to help Colombia overcome its problems.​[30]​ 


In response to Patten’s statements, Colombian Vice President, Francisco Santos, in an interview with the newspaper El Tiempo, denounced Europe for having “a neocolonial concept of justice in Colombia" and for treating the country as a "banana republic.” 

	There is a pervasive criticism in the European Parliament of the Colombian government.  In the 2002 electoral process, a delegation of the European Parliament warned of the risks of spreading some of the effects of the Colombian conflict in the region and advocated a regional approach as a solution of the problem.​[31]​ 

	The EU Parliament has also reacted against the U.S. approach to the conflict. Under a conservative-Christian Democratic majority, it passed a resolution opposing the Plan Colombia (with 474 votes in favor, only one against, and 33 abstentions), “perceived in Europe as inspired by the United States with ‘militaristic’ and counter-insurgency purposes, with the potential of danger for spillover to other Andean neighbors.”​[32]​ In direct reference to the conflict itself, conservatives stress the abuses committed by the guerrillas (collectively or on an individual basis) whereas the European left emphasizes the deep roots of the conflict in the social inequality and the collapse of Colombia’s state system.​[33]​

	The European Parliament has been a critic of President Uribe’s policies.  In February 2004, 20 parliamentarians (some people say 100) walked out of a speech by President Uribe to protest the 2004 Colombian anti-terrorism law, which grants sweeping powers to the armed forces to detain suspects without warrants, tap phones and search homes.  They were headed by Monica Frassoni, leader of the Green group.  This protest is explained by the fact that in 2002  the Green Federations of the Americas, Europe, Africa, and Asia Pacific, “in an unprecedented show of global Green solidarity, published a letter to FARC calling on the guerrilla movement to release kidnapped Colombian presidential candidate Ingrid Betancourt, presidential candidate by the coalition Green Oxygen Party-For a New Colombia.”​[34]​ Likewise, this case has been particularly relevant for European lawmakers because Betancourt is also a French citizen.​[35]​ In this context, the then-President of the European Parliament, Pat Cox, received President Uribe and stated face to face that “we consider essential to develop a fully functioning democratic state. Exceptions with respect to human rights are not acceptable.”​[36]​

External Networks with NGOs

EU networks with external partners are crucial in the implementation of policies.  In fact, in cases of internal conflicts, such as in Colombia, the know-how of NGOs is decisive in reaching the EU’s goals.  To some extent, the relationship between NGOs and the Commission is a two-way street because they both try to get something from the other.  Commissioner Siim Kallas has acknowledged the role of NGOs in the policy making and has stated that “There is nothing wrong with lobbies because each decision-making process needs proper information from different angles.”​[37]​ Similar to the U.S. political system, lobbing the EU policy makers is a way for exerting influence on the final outcomes.  At the moment, there are about 15,000 lobbyists established in Brussels, while around 2,600 interest groups have permanent offices in Brussels.  Lobbying activities are estimated to produce 60 to 90 million in annual revenues.  In this context, the Commission channels over €2 billion to developing countries through NGOs, a situation that has led Commissioner Kallas to assert that, “The word ‘non’ is quite fictitious.  Some of the NGOs receiving funds from the Commission describe from (on) their website one of their main tasks as:’ lobbying the Commission.”​[38]​  In this regard, the 2004-2009 Commission is implementing a European Transparency Initiative, which seeks to increase transparency in these networks because people have the right to know how their money is being spent, including NGOs. 

	Having in mind the nature of the NGOs-Commission relationship described above, the European Office for Emergency Humanitarian Aid (ECHO), which was set up in April 1992, has fostered the creation of networks with NGOs.  As part of the strategy to get external partners involved, ECHO works with 210 partners worldwide, which are organizations that have signed a contract with the European Commission.  Between 1992 and 1999, ECHO spent approximately €4 billion on relief operations via 170 agencies which had signed framework partnership contracts. Among these partners, NGOs accounted for 56 percent of spending, UN agencies 25 percent, other international organizations (e.g. International Red Cross) 11 percent, and the remaining percentage by ECHO or specialist member state agencies.​[39]​  

Based upon the annual ECHO aid strategy, in 2003 ECHO accounted for a budget of €442.5 million, aimed to enhance and refine the reforms initiated in 2001, among others, the transparent dialogue with ECHO’s partners and other humanitarian agencies.  Current Commissioner Michel has reiterated the need for reform of the policies of humanitarian aid, based upon three priorities.  The first issue is to place development as an integral part of the external action of the EU.  The second is to strengthen the practice of partnership, attempting to overcome some of the past mistakes of vertical aid cooperation.  Commissioner Michel is straightforward in this regard: “Too often in the past we in the ‘north’ have set the priorities for developing countries.  And partnership starts at home.”​[40]​ The third priority is the effectiveness of humanitarian aid.

NGOs worldwide have contributed to strengthening the role of the EU in the Third World by the multiple feedbacks (information on the ground) they provide to EU institutions and their surveillance practices over donor and receiver governments.  In this regard, three main types of European NGOs can be differentiated.  The first encompasses those based in the Netherlands, Scandinavian countries and UK, which have a long tradition of active civil society participation.  Based upon such long-standing practices, some British NGOs have transformed themselves into multinational organizations; this is the case of OXFAM, Save the Children and Amnesty International.  The second cluster is made of other countries that have recently developed policies towards NGOs because their democracies are younger; this is the case of Greece, Spain and Portugal.  The third group of countries shares a strong role for the state in the activities of NGOs, such as the case of France, where NGOs coexist with a strongly centralized state, or Germany with the reemergence of NGOs supported by the state.​[41]​ 

With regard to the performance of the NGOs beyond the European borders, Latin America is a region in the lower layers of their priorities.  Influenced by colonial links, some countries give priority to specific countries. British NGOs are particularly active in Central Asia and French ones   in some African countries.  Quite relevant in the memory of European NGOs and EU institutions is the joint work in Central Europe.  In spite of the fact that the transitions in most of post-communist countries were state-led, namely, “centrally organized democratization,” NGOs had a real impact on the political and economic areas in the region, particularly in the spread of democracy as a culture. Also in geographical terms, from the perspective of ECHO and once the 2004 enlargement process took place, the most general tendency in humanitarian aid policy is to withdraw from Eastern Europe and focus more on Africa and Asia. According to the 2003 ECHO’s report, the most important operations were conducted in Africa (Great Lakes, West Africa, and Southern Africa), Afghanistan, the northern Caucasus (Chechnya), the Middle East (Palestinian Territories), and Western Sahara.  The last place in the list of ECHO’s priorities was to Colombia​[42]​

In this context, during the military and authoritarian regimes in Latin America in the 1970s and 1980s, political parties, foundations and universities were important non-governmental interlocutors in Europe.  In the last ten years, due to flaws in the implementation of cooperation policies, the EU and many European governments have also included some degree of decentralization in the aid to Latin America for three reasons:​[43]​  a) if people participate, aid policy is more legitimate in the eyes of public opinion; b) plurality strengthens democracy; and c) there is a steady surveillance among the participants in an aid project.

In the specific case of Colombia, the Commission has allocated resources of € 330 million to civil society initiatives in the past five years.  In February 2004, during President Uribe’s visit to Europe, a new program was launched to support the integration process and improve the living conditions of internally displaced people, with a total budget of € 9.2 million for 2004-2005.  This project is currently being implemented by the EU and local NGOs with the support of the Colombian government represented by the National Solidarity Network (Red de Solidaridad National). 

	The flagship EU project is the Peace Laboratory Magdalena Medio with the participation of local networks.  Following the strategy of getting NGOs involved, the Commission has delegated the implementation of the first phase to the Development and Peace Cooperation of the Magdalena Medio, awarded Colombia’s National Prize, with a long record of intervention in the Magdalena Medio, and credibility among the Colombian population.​[44]​ The first Laboratory in Magdalena Medio started in March 2002 and includes four elements: 1) peace culture and integral rights, 2) productive activities, 3) productive and social infrastructures and 4) institutional re-enforcement.  It foresees a Community financing of €34.8 million and will last eight years. 

	However, the role of the European Commission working with its partners through ECHO goes beyond the confines of the Magdalena Medio region.  Table 2 summarizes the participation of the NGOs on the ground. 


Table 2ECHO’s Partners in Colombia
Partner	Aid provided	Department
Action Against Hunger, Spain	Clean water, sanitation, food, school rehabilitation	Magdalena Cordoba
Caritas Spain	Psychological support, shelter, good sanitation	Huila, Meta
Red Cross International Committee	Access to conflicting areas to help victims; food, essential non-food items	Areas in conflict
International Committee for the Development of People. Italy	Socioeconomic reinsertion, psychological support	Antioquia, Quindio, Caldas, Risalralda
Spanish Red Cross	psychological support, basic health care	Magdalena Medio, Bolivar, Antioquia
French Red Cross	basic health care	Narino
Dutch Red Cross	psychological support, basic health care	Caqueta, Risaralda, Caqueta
Movimondo Italy	Community centers, food aid, psychological support, economic activities	Valle del Cauca, Cauca, Narino
Movement for Peace, Disarmament and Freedom, Spain	economic activities, sanitation, clean water	Cesar, Sucre, Bolivar
UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA)	Coordination of different humanitarian agencies, evaluation of the needs, elaboration of studies	n/a
Oxfam, United Kingdom	economic activities, clean water, public health, housing reconstruction. 	Choco, Antioquía, Santander North
International Solidarity, Spain	psychological support, economic activities, clean water, public health, housing reconstruction	Valle del Cauca, Cauca and Narino.
Source: Own elaboration based on ECHO, Construyendo un Nuevo Futuro (Brussels, 2003)


In addition to ECHOs partners, there are some other NGOs who are receiving funding from the EU and are playing a very constructive part in the pacification of Colombia.  The European Commission has awarded the Colombian Commission of Jurists (CCJ) with € 650,000 for projects that aim to strengthen social and institutional capacity for the promotion and defense of civil and political rights in Colombia.  On the other hand, the Office of the Human Rights Commissioner of UN (OHCHR) has received € 600,000 for improving prison conditions in Colombia.  Likewise, Terre de Hommes (Italian NGO) has been financed by the Human Rights and Democracy Programme of the European Commission. 

	Other NGOs have also contributed to the debate on the pacification of Colombia. Amnesty International, through its annual reports, has pressured some EU members to explain suspicious double standards of their national policies with regard to Colombia.  This is the case of the February 2004 Amnesty International report, in which this NGO demanded that the Spanish government (under J.M. Aznar) transferred of arms to Colombia in violation of the 1998 Conduct Code, signed by the EU members. 

With regard to other EU members, the British government has declared their admiration for the progress made by Uribe’s administration, but they have refused to take any notice of the damaging reports released by Colombian and international NGOs (see Colombian Commission of Jurists report) that proved that the human rights situation in Colombia had actually deteriorated, and that the government had manipulated and falsified the figures.  	Germany and other European governments have had a sense of disillusionment after the failure of the peace talks between the Pastrana government and the guerrilla movements in 2002.  Since then, the Colombian government under Uribe has had limited success in explaining its position to European governments.  Many Europeans – in the governments and in the NGOs – are arguing that the security measures adopted by the Uribe Administration are violating human rights.  A focus of this criticism is the 2004 antiterrorism legislation, which grants powers of arrest and interrogation to the Colombian armed forces with limited judicial control.​[45]​  







The complexity of the Colombian case has demanded from the international community the participation of a plurality of actors in order to restore the confidence for a peaceful future. Although its contribution has been modest, the EU has displayed resources in a creative fashion, particularly by giving back to the affected people the opportunity to reconstruct their lives. NGOs, local and international, have been a key player to implement on the ground some of the decisions made in Brussels. 
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